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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF MARYE. RATLIFF,
Deceased
EARL McLAIN et al. and FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents

Case No.
10604

vs.

MAYBELLE R. CONRAD,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was a probate proceeding instituted on the petition
of Earl McLain and certain other legatees named in the
purported last will and testament of Mary E. Ratliff, Deceased. The appellant objected to the admission to probate of instruments which were not the originals of the
said purported will and a codicil thereto.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court below admitted the purported will and codicil
to probate upon the production and proof of a certified

copy thereof. The court denied appellant's motion for
new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Order Admitting Will to Probate and remand of the proceedings to
to said court with instructions that the original instruments must be deposited with the court before any further
hearing is conducted toward admission of will to probate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mary E. Ratliff died on June 20, 1965, in Arapahoe
County, Colorado [R-1, Petition for Probate of Will (Corrected)]. The original of an instrument purporting to be
decedent's last will and testament dated October 6, 1961,
and the original first codicil thereto dated May 1, 1962,
were lodged with the Clerk of the District Court in and
for Douglas County, Colorado, on July 13, 1965 [R-12,
Clerk's Certificate].
A Petition for Probate of Will, to which was attached
a photo copy of the purported will, was filed with the
Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for
Uintah County, Utah, on November 19, 1965, by several
of the legatees under said purported will [R-1]. A Petition
for Probate of Will was filed with the Douglas County,
Colorado, Court on November 26, 1965 by appellant, a
legatee and sole heir of decedent [R-15, Answer to Demand for Original Will]. The Uintah County proceeding was held in abeyance pending admission of the Will
to probate in Colorado. However, a will contest developed
in the Colorado proceeding whereupon the Uintah County hearing was set for January 4, 1966 [R-15].
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At the hearing on January 4, 1966, in the court below,
a copy of the instruments lodged with the Clerk of the
District Court in Douglas County, Colorado, certified by
the Clerk, were introduced [R-24, 25, T-5, 6]. Ralph
Sargent, the sole surviving attesting witness, testified
from these copies [R-24, T-5] and they were admitted in
evidence [R-31, T-12]. Upon the testimony of Ralph
Sargent concerning the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the purported will and codicil [R-23, 24, T-4,
SJ, the testimony of Amelia Manker as to the decedent's
presence in Vernal, Utah, during the spring of 1965 and
references to a house in which decedent lived and a car
which she drove [R-27, 28, T-8, 9] and the testimony of
Morris Cook as to decedent's voting in the 1964 election
[R-29, 30, T-10, 11 ], the "will" was admitted to probate
rR-31, 33, T-12, 14]. Appellant repeatedly objected to the
proceeding and moved to stay proceedings pending production of the original purported will and codicil, but
these objections were overruled.
ARGUMENT
I.
A WILL CANNOT BE ADMITTED TO PROBATE
CPON THE PRODUCTION AND PROOF OF A CERTIFIED COPY WHEN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
IS KNOWN TO BE IN EXISTENCE AND LODGED
IN ANOTHER COURT OF PROBATE.
Prior to the marvels of modern photo copy equipment
this case could never have arisen because a certified copy
would have borne no necessary resemblance to the original
of the certified document. Thus, it would have been im-
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possible to establish the legal status of a purported will
upon production and execution of a certified copy.
We submit that the advent of the photo copy machine
has not caused such a deterioration in the worth of an
original will that it will no longer be required for probate
purposes. Further, the fact that the original will is held bv
some responsible party and that he has certified a certai~
photo copy to be a copy of the original will should not suffice in lieu of the original itself.
The Probate Code consistently uses the word "will" not
"certified copy of will" except in special circumstances
noted hereinafter. For example, 75-1-2 provides that wills
must be proved; 75-3 is replete with the word will. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the legislature has in several cases
clearly authorized the use of copies of wills in probate
proceedings. 75-3-23 relating to probate of foreign wills
specifically states that copies of wills, duly authenticated,
are adequate. 75-3-25, 26 and 27 relating to proof of lost
or destroyed wills also clearly contemplate the use of
copies upon proof that the will was in existence and has
been lost or destroyed. Neither of these situations are applicable in the instant case.
In this connection the case of In re Frandsen's Will, 50
U. 156, 167 P. 362 (1917) is noteworthy. This case involved proof of a lost or destroyed will which had at one
time been recorded in the county clerk's office. The \\:ill
was shown to have been in existence when the testator
became mentally incompetent and, therefore, the court
held that the will must have been in effect at her death.
The court did not permit proof of the will, however, by
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introduction of the county clerk's record. The court said
in passing that anyone having compared the record with
the original could have testified to the correctness of the
copy and the copy could then have been used as an examined copy of the original. We note, then, that even in
the case of a lost or destroyed will a copy is not independent
evidence of a will except under the rule of examined copy.
Cases supporting the proposition that probate proceedings must be stayed until production of the original will
include In re Barney's Will, 94 N.J. Eq. 392, 120 A. 513
(1923), and In re De Buck's Estate, 125 N.J. Eq. 80, 4 A.2d
309 (1939). An earlier New Jersey case, In re Morrissey's
Will, 91 N.J. Eq. 289, 107 A. 70 (1919), held that production of the original will is jurisdictional. See Page On Wills,
§26.37 (1961).
Those seeking probate in Uintah County might contend
that they had no alternative but to proceed without the
original will. This would not be the case. The will and
codicil having been lodged with the District Court in
Douglas County, Colorado, any of the petitione1s, particularly the Executor named in the will, could have petitioned for probate in that court at any time. Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 153-5-22. In the alternative, petitioners could have challenged the jurisdiction of the Court in
Douglas County to probate the will, and if successful,
could have had the will transferred to the Court in Uintah
County, Utah. Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, 153-5-23;
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 450. Instead, Petitioners simply demanded that counsel for appellant forward the original will [R-13]. Counsel was, of course,
unable to comply with this demand, the will and codicil
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having been formally lodged with the Court in Douglas
County, Colorado.
Legal authority requiring production of the original will
for probate, where not proved to have been lost or destroyed, is supported by sound reason. Among a number of
potentially serious problems to be noted in connection with
the creation of any precedent permitting the probate of
certified copies of wills where the original is in existence
and is lodged with another court of probate are the following:
I. The traditional inviolability of the will is jeopar- '
dized. This challenges the very essence of wills and probate.
2. The problem of proof is at once apparent and the
safeguards embodied in our law since the Statute of Wills
are needlessly weakened.
3. Several probates can be initiated and conducted at
the same time with conflicting results. Comity may or may
not prevent collision courses from developing.
In summary, the court below erred in admitting to probate as the will of Mary E. Ratliff a document which was
a certified copy of an instrument lodged with another
court of probate. The Order Admitting Will to Probate
should, therefore, be reversed and the court directed to
stay proceedings on any Petition for Probate until the
original document for which probate is desired is produced.
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II.

EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRO BA TE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
ORDER OF THE COURT ADMITTING THE WILL
TO PROBATE.
In addition to the error urged in the first argument, it
is submitted that petitioners introduced insufficient evidence at the hearing on January 4, 1966, to support the
allegations of jurisdiction made in the Petition for Probate.
These jurisdictional grounds were residence in Uintah
County and property located in Uintah County at the
time of decedent's death [R-1].
The only evidence as to decedent's residence \Vas testimony of Amelia Manker that the decedent had been in
Vernal for three or four months during the spring of 1965
[R-27, T-8], and the testimony of Morris Cook that she
had voted in 1964 [R-30, T-11 ]. Nothing appears as to decedent's domicile or intentions at the time of her death.
Evidence of decedent's property in Vernal was limited
to Amelia Manker's passing reference to the decedent's
house [R-27, T-8] and a car driven by decedent and which
was variously located in front of the laundry-mat and at
her garage. No evidence was introduced as to the nature
of decedent's ownership interest, if any, in these assets.
By virtue of petitioners' failure to support these jurisdictional allegations, therefore, it is submitted that the
court below erred in admitting the "will" to probate and
the Order Admitting Will to Probate should be reversed.
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III.
APPELLANT COMPLIED SUBSTANTIALLY WITH '
RULE 73(a) IN PERFECTING THIS APPEAL AND
THE COURT MAY EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING WHETHER UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE APPEAL SHOULD BE ALLOWED.
Respondents have moved to dismiss this appeal upon
the grounds that this Court lacks jurisdiction. The manner
in which the appeal was filed is alleged as the basis for this
motion to dismiss.
Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"A party may appeal from a judgment by filing
with the district court a notice of appeal, together with sufficient copies thereof for mailing to the
Supreme Court and all other parties to the judgment, and depositing therewith the fee required
for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court."
The rule allows one month from the entry of judgment
\vithin which an appeal may be taken.
In this case motion for new trial was denied March l,
1966, and appellant had until April 1, 1966, to take her
appeal. A Notice of Appeal was in fact received by the
Clerk of the District Court and by counsel for respondents
on Friday, April 1, 1966, through the United States mails,
from counsel for appellant in Roosevelt, Utah. Monday,
April 4, 1966, the Clerk received in the same manner additional copies of the Notice of Appeal for attorneys for
respondents. Friday, April 8, 1966, the Clerk received the
filing fee of $3.50 and only then filed the Notice of Appeal.
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It is to be noted that counsel for appellant was in Roosevelt, Utah, whereas the District Court was in Vernal.
Counsel did not have the convenience of proximity with
the filing office nor the benefit of communication from the
filing office as to the absence of copies and fee which were
required. Had use of the mails not been necessary, and had
personal contact been made between the filing office and
counsel, both of which under other circumstances are
likely, the situation as to copies of the Notice of Appeal
and the filing fee would not have occurred.
No decision of this Court has been uncovered interpreting the present rule as jurisdictional insofar as copies nf
the Notice and filing fee are concerned. The essence of
the rule is notice to the trial court that an appeal will be
taken. Appellant more than fulfilled this condition by mailing to the Clerk of the District Court and to opposing
counsel a Notice of Appeal which was received within the
prescribed one month period. Rule 73(a) does not contemplate that any further action need be accomplished
within the one month period by virtue of the fact that the
Notice may be filed the last day of such period.
Appellant concedes that this Court has broad discretion
in determining what disposition is to be made of an appeal
involving timeliness of procedural steps. It is submitted
that the significance of this case, together with the circumstances surrounding the taking of the appeal, warrant
the use of the Court's discretion in favor of a decision on
the merits. The respondents' motion to dismiss should,
therefore, be denied and the case heard and determined
on its merits.
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CONCLUSION
The Order Admitting Will to Probate entered by the
Court below is contrary to the law and evidence of this
case. To allow this order to stand would create precedent
for a new method of probate not recognized by any statute
or court in the United States. Such a departure is solely
a matter of legislative concern not judicial decision. For
these reasons the Order Admitting Will to Probate should
be reversed and the case remanded.
Respectfully submitted,

R. EARL DILLMAN
Roosevelt, Utah
Tel. 20
HOLLAND & HART,
BRUCE T. BUELL
500 Equitable Bldg.
Denver, Colorado 80202
Tel. 303-292-9200

As attorneys for
May belle R. Conrad,
Appellant.
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